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1. What is a ‘musical work’?
Reflections on the origins of the
‘work concept’ in western art music1
John Butt
To many, it would still seem absurd to suggest that there is any argument
to be had about how ‘musical works’ exist: the answer is surely obvious
to anyone with an interest in the history of western classical music, since
even the titles alone can conjure up a host of past and possible
performances and, most importantly, experiences. Moreover, most musi-
cal works are associated with a documentary trace, the score, by which
certain parameters are fixed, others suggested or left open, and the work
can thus be identified as a document qualifying for copyright protection
or authorial ownership, much in the manner of a verbal text.
Already though, this very brief sketch of assumptions is reliant on
specific contexts of performance, authorship, title and documentation,
which are all too easily naturalised across diverse types of music (witness
a growing concern with authorship, ownership and varying levels of
‘authenticity’ in reproduction within the history of popular music). There
is something definitely ‘western’ about this too. While there might indeed
be canons of ‘high’ and ‘low’ music in the traditions of countless
non-western cultures, very few of them are concerned with documentary
precision or the intellectual property rights of individual, unique creators
(of course, this is not to say that western-style music, in both ‘art’ and
popular categories, cannot successfully be introduced or indeed created
within these cultures).
If there is this synchronic observation to be made across contemporary
cultures, might there not also be a diachronic one? In other words, if
‘musical works’ have more resonance in some parts of the world than
others, might they not also thrive in specific eras of western history? The
1 This chapter reworks several substantial passages previously published in
Butt (2005) and Butt (2010).
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historicity of musical works has long been a concern among German
musicologists, most particularly Carl Dahlhaus and Walter Wiora.2
Writers in this tradition tend to assume that in any given period there is a
phenomenological entity that can be defined as a ‘work’ so long as our
command of language and our intuition of the dynamics of music history
are up to the task. In this view, if many works in the later stages of
western music history acquired features that gave them a greater claim to
autonomy (assuming that this is a useful criterion in defining a ‘work’),
this was more a matter of degree than of kind. Within the context of the
European tradition, there is for many, therefore, an essential trans-
historical unity implied by the concept of a work. Certainly, develop-
ments in music notation, tonal harmony and increasingly mechanised
methods of reproduction helped produce a more solidly ‘work-like’ work
from, say, the mid-eighteenth century onwards, and most specifically in
western Europe. Music from previous times was not automatically
devalued (although that might often have been the net result), but rather
valued for the degree to which it provided an important precursor for the
‘fuller’ work, a sort of ‘Old Testament’ to ground the ‘New’. Works here
fitted into a progressive narrative (each new work having to represent a
‘step further’), with faintly Whiggish pretentions.
But, in the decades following World War II it is not difficult to detect
a slight unease about the direction of musical progress among both
composers and historians. To put it simplistically: were we beginning to
run out of notes? Were we producing music that might possibly not make
any sense to the human ear and understanding? Most importantly, was
classical music, just like other arts, becoming irrelevant in an increas-
ingly connected world, in which ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultures had equal
claims to value?
The 1960s saw the beginnings of the dissolution of the ‘highbrow’ in
relation to the academic study of literature, and musicology was not that
far behind. From the 1980s onwards, US scholars (some inspired by
contemporary French and German thinkers) became increasingly irritated
by the dryness and deference of traditional ‘positivist’ scholarship.3 Soon
the very basis of the ‘academic canon’ was called into question and even
war-horses of the western tradition were becoming subject to various
forms of ‘deconstruction’ (ranging from the colloquial sense of uncover-
ing social and cultural norms concealed within them to the more
2 Dahlhaus (1983); Seidel (1987); Wiora (1983 (1988)).
3 This move is often conveniently, and justifiably, dated to the publication of
Joseph Kerman’s trenchant critique of contemporary ‘positivist’ musicology,
Kerman (1985).
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theoretical, Derridian approach). Scholars split roughly into those who
wanted to save the classical canon from itself (and particularly from its
devotees) by taking issues of culture, politics and gender head on, and
others who wanted to see this music dethroned and – at best – as only
one music among many within popular and world traditions. In all, the
ground was extremely well prepared for the most influential English-
language study of the musical work, which appeared in 1992, The
imaginary museum of musical works, by Lydia Goehr.4
One of the most disarming aspects of Goehr’s approach was the fact
that she came from outside the usual circles of American/UK musicology,
and seemed – at least in this book – unaware of the disputes currently
underway (which usually came under the stirring, but ultimately facile,
title of ‘New Musicology’). Her targets were, rather, in another field
entirely, one considerably more hermetic than the all-singing world of
musicology: analytic philosophy. Philosophers in this tradition share
something with music analysts (themselves very different beasts from
historical musicologists) in considering musical works to subsist
independently of their historical position and cultural context. Indeed
these ‘external’ aspects could be seen as damaging distractions from the
task of rendering the abstract structures of musical works much more
latent.
Goehr’s thesis was hardly radical in itself: not unlike German music-
ologists in the preceding decades, she asserted that the concept of the
musical work is historically conditioned. More provocative was her view
that the work concept did not develop until around 1800 and that, strictly
speaking, no musical works were written before this time (not even,
seemingly, by Monteverdi, Bach or Mozart). In Goehr’s account, no
analytic theory adequately accounts for the historical boundary of the
music that it concerns. The notion of the work is, instead, a Wittgenstein-
ian ‘open concept’, allowing for the subtraction or addition of defining
characteristics provided that its continuity is preserved and that it is
consistently recognisable over its period of operation. Open concepts are
thus “signposts” facilitating language use. The work concept is also a
‘regulative’ concept, one that defines certain normative and interrelating
practices that are implied when we talk of musical works.5
Goehr seeks to show how the many strands constituting the work
concept came together around 1800, so that it is, in fact, closely
associated with early Romantic aesthetics of music. Defining features
4 Goehr (1992/2007).
5 Ibid., pp. 89–101, quote from p. 93.
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include the notion of the unique, original composer, a distinction between
art and craft, a defining written score of the work, a sense of musical
autonomy distinct from other aspects of the world (especially the
everyday), a formalist move towards inner rather than outer significance,
a co-option of religion by music, stronger copyright laws, the construc-
tion of concert halls as the principal premises for musical consumption,
and, most importantly perhaps, disinterested contemplation on the part of
the listener. While many of these strands are present before that date
(thus certain pieces and composers show a superficial affinity with pieces
and composers from the period in which Goehr’s work concept became
operative), in the strictest sense, only ‘pieces of music’ exist before 1800,
not ‘musical works’.
Inevitably, Goehr’s book has engendered considerable discussion, not
least the objections from scholars of earlier music, who clearly feel that
their research would be devalued if the music concerned were no longer
given the status of ‘musical work’. But most of the discussion has
ignored one of the more productive issues to be implied by Goehr’s
historicist approach. This is the notion that we should not just be
discussing whether works as actual objects, or as idealised embodiments
of pieces of music, existed at one time or another, but rather whether the
interaction between ideas held about music, various social practices and
the various musical objects or events at hand together generated the
notion of the musical work. If some tend to assume that musical works
are objects that are basically non-human and thus stable in character
(those on the side of analytical philosophy and music analysis), others
have surely gone too far in the direction of social constructivism and
assumed that pieces of music exist only by virtue of the attitudes of a
particular society – that there is nothing essentially ‘there’ beyond the
cultural norms at hand. For a while, it was a moment for uncontrollable
mirth and sarcastic put-down whenever any scholar unwittingly men-
tioned ‘the music itself’, since this clearly showed a refusal to admit the
necessary human constructivist element into music and, at worst, evi-
denced an elitist, culturally normative attitude to western art. Yet the
vertiginous attitude of social constructivists towards objects of art, while
a stern lesson for those who underestimate the importance of human
involvement at every level, is surely beginning to sound as tired as that
argument of America’s NRA (National Rifle Association), namely, that
‘guns don’t kill people, people do’. This would seem to suggest that guns
are neutral, innocent, objects that are constituted as weapons only
through human agency; they cannot influence the human, or put evil
ideas into one’s head that are not there already. Here I am very much
influenced by Bruno Latour’s attitude to the findings and ‘facts’ of
4 Concept of music and copyright
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Rahmatian-Concepts_of_Music_and_Copyright / Division: 01-1Rahmatian_JButtChapter1edited_corr /
Pg. Position: 4 / Date: 10/8
JOBNAME: Rahmatian PAGE: 5 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 14 09:17:01 2015
science: rather than opting for a natural order ‘out there’ on the one hand,
or total social construction on the other, he sees a constant circulation
between the human and the non-human. Facts and natural objects
obviously have to be constructed or formulated in order to be recognis-
able and accessible to the human understanding, but they also acquire a
little autonomy in return, influencing what appears as, and how we
conceive of, the world around us.6
Pieces of music – whether remembered, composed in the mind, notated
or sounded – are obviously human constructions through and through,
but they also acquire an element of autonomy instantaneously. We cannot
necessarily predict how we are going to react to, or conceive of, them at
any point in the future. If we are somehow changed through our
encounter with music, something must surely somehow be ‘there’ and not
merely be constructed by us on the spur of the moment. But what the
argument for social constructivism does indeed show us is that what is
‘there’ is not a stable entity that endures regardless of the energy we
bring to it.
In examining the possibility of work concepts before that of the
nineteenth century some, such as Reinhard Strohm, look for similarities
linking one age to another. Therefore, the move towards the profiled
composer and the perfection of individual works (as was happening in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, if not before) is precisely that
which Strohm considers essential for the European tradition as a whole.
It would thus be false to suggest that the western tendency to abstract art
from its context and function, treating it as if it were a world in itself, is
just a nineteenth-century invention.7 But, according to Goehr, what
renders this later conception unique are the specific social, aesthetic and
analytic practices attached to music, ones that resonate with earlier ‘work
concepts’ but which do not necessarily constitute a more refined,
perfected version of a consistent concept. As she later writes, the fact that
the origins of the work concept can often individually be traced back to
earlier periods does not mean that the fully fledged concept emerged
then. To her, apparent similarities, such as the perfection of a notated
musical text or a canon of commendable pieces of music, hide profound
differences in culture in which the meaning of a perfected text or
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Strohm correctly complains that Goehr tends to homogenise the
incredibly complex and varied attitudes to pieces of music before 1800,
blatantly ignoring factors that in some respect come close to elements of
the later work concept. But she is surely right to insist that we critically
examine the roots of our conceptions (a clear example of Nietzsche’s
‘critical’ use of history).9 While there is a very real sense in which we try
to influence our successors – a crucial element in child-rearing for
instance – most forms of significant artistic influence draw on the past
and react to ideas that are already there. Crudely put, the processes of
influence and development are characterised more by sucking than
blowing. We cannot simply assume that any innovation of a past era was
made with anything close to the forward-looking aim that we now might
attribute to it.
This point is, of course, one of the central elements of Darwinian
evolution, but the concept of evolution is more popularly associated with
a process that is progressive and developmental, one in which there is
some ideal end in mind even if earlier actors were not aware of this. This
brings us back to the so-called Whiggish approach to history, in which
aspects of the past are highlighted for their foreshadowing of a more
perfect and enlightened present. It is against this concept of evolution and
progress that I most take issue. There is nothing wrong with finding
resonances in the past (granted that there is the danger of presentism) –
this is, after all, one of the crucial functions of history, which serves to
enhance our own sense of belonging to a broader culture of humanity.
But this should not be confused with a sense of the past seeking
resonances in the future. The Whiggish approach also tends to undervalue
aspects of the past that do not conform to its particular model of
progress; so it may well render us ignorant of alternative concepts,
events, styles or pieces that were dropped from the historical or cultural
canons, but from which we still might be able to learn. This is especially
pertinent to music from the seventeenth century, for instance, when the
very instability of concepts of music led to a degree of experimentation
that was probably unprecedented. Many pieces from this time might well
be undervalued or ignored if we merely judged them according to
whether they were ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ in relation to the game of work-laden
hide-and-seek.
Another crucial reason to resist the notion that composers and other
musicians were aiming towards the work concept all along is that this
attitude might ultimately be detrimental to the very institution of western
9 Nietzsche (1983).
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art music as it exists today. Only by recognising the contingency of the
work concept, only by recognising its historical boundedness, do we have
a chance of planning for its survival and revival in a rapidly changing
world. Blind belief in its universal validity will not by itself preserve the
institution. As Latour remarks for the apparently far more robust field of
scientific facts: ‘It is always dangerous to imagine that at some point in
history, inertia is enough to keep up the reality of phenomena that have
been so difficult to produce’, there is no such thing as a ‘final’ victory
that requires no further work or action.10 Even cherished near-universal
values, such as democracy or fundamental human rights, need constant
attention and effort; if these are taken as givens they may simply
disappear over time.
In all, Goehr’s study is particularly useful in showing how modern
analytic theories of music are all beholden to the work concept, specific-
ally in the guise in which it arose at the end of the eighteenth century,
and thus tend to apply only to certain values and repertories of the
nineteenth century and half the twentieth. Much can be disputed concern-
ing her generalisations about nineteenth-century musical culture, in
which the performative and improvisational could still be very important.
But what I set out to do in the remainder of this chapter is to flesh out a
little of the argument that Goehr leaves even less well supported, namely,
the issue of how pieces of music were developed and conceived of during
the three centuries before 1800. If everything did indeed fall into place at
that latter point (and even if that point is negotiable, as it surely must be),
what were the preconditions? My ultimate aim is to see whether such
preconditions relate to any aspects of western history, culture or period-
isation that can help explain the overall phenomenon of the western
musical work in broad but non-universalist terms. My overall hypothesis
is that the musical work in its more reified senses relates to the covering
conditions of modernity.
Goehr’s claim would seem senseless if we were to take at face value
Listenius’s statement (from the 1530s)11 that the art of musica poetica
results in a ‘perfect and absolute opus’ that survives the death of its
maker. According to Heinz von Loesch, Listenius may not be referring
exclusively or even primarily to individual pieces of music. Von Loesch
argues that this formulation is one that early Lutheran music theorists
10 Latour (1999: 155, 168).
11 Listenius developed this definition from the opening of Rudimenta musi-
cae (1533) to a fuller version in Musica: Ab authore denuo recognita multisque
novis regulis (1537). For a comprehensive survey of these writings and the
tradition that they engendered, see von Loesch (2001).
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adopted from Aristotle and Quintilian to describe the activity of produc-
tion in general, which could equally result in printed publications or
theoretical treatises (even if Listenius’s formulation was soon to become
associated exclusively with musical compositions). Given that the essen-
tially German theoretical tradition of musica poetica – of which Listenius
was one of the founders – was to die out (together with the theoretical
reliance on Aristotle and Quintilian) in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, it is unlikely that this was a significant component
of later, progressively stronger concepts of work. On the other hand, one
could argue that there is a sort of work concept, across most of the arts,
right back in the ancient world. But if there is, it contains very few of the
regulative conditions that Goehr claims became operative in 1800.
Therefore, in exploring the possibilities for a work concept in earlier
centuries, much depends on the combination of characteristics that one
considers necessary for a work. This might involve simply the identity
and portability of notated musical pieces by famous composers as
implied by Tinctoris (1477), or something closer to Goehr’s open,
regulative concept that requires a broad combination of conditions such
as the separability of musical works from extra-musical environments,
bourgeois concert-hall practice, and copyright. One way out of this
impasse might be to take Gretel Schwörer-Kohl’s distinction between a
broader (and weaker) sense of ‘work’ and the narrower sub-category of
‘opus-work’ as a starting point.12 The broader concept would cover
compositions resulting from ‘creative activity of the highest order’, some
form of self-contained formal structure, and some historical durability.
But the concept of the ‘opus-work’ would demand more notational fixity,
attribution to a specific author, and some degree of originality within the
context of the age. The broader concept of work could be applied to a
wide range of music, including much non-western music, while the
‘opus-work’ would refer mainly to the western classical tradition, more
or less in Goehr’s sense, and only to a limited number of non-western
traditions.
Nevertheless, this distinction is not without its problems. The term
‘opus’ has a long history and was already well established in the
sixteenth century. This might perhaps reflect the transfer of work
concepts from other artistic fields, but it still does not necessarily evoke
the individualised and unique connotations of Schwörer-Kohl’s definition
of the ‘opus-work’. Moreover, her inclusion of ‘creative activity of the
highest order’ as a principal definition of the broader sense of ‘work’
12 Schwörer-Kohl (1997).
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begs a question of relative quality that cannot objectively be answered; it
also raises the issue of whether the judgement is made from the
standpoint of the composer’s environment or of later reception. Perhaps
the broader definition should be liberalised to include any musical entity
(be it an event, a musical text, or just an idea) that can be perceived,
remembered or discussed. Yet this would make the term ‘work’ virtually
synonymous with ‘piece of music’ and thus more or less superfluous. The
word ‘work’ works to the extent that it carries some sort of charge that
‘music’ on its own would not otherwise hold.
So significant is the charge associated with workhood in the western
tradition that, to many, it is imperative to trace the roots of its corollary,
compositional thinking, to its earliest stages and follow these through the
subsequent centuries. Workhood can thus be thought of as something that
develops in tandem with the very concept of western civilisation and the
sense of ‘universality’ that this brings.13 Strohm makes the point that
there has always been a ‘cohabitation’ of functional elements with
‘work-like significance’ in music; thus it is a mistake to take the absence
of a specific functional role as a crucial factor in defining any particular
piece as a work.14 From this perspective it is eminently possible to see
musicians from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries as playing their part
in the creation of conditions that ‘full’ workhood co-opted during the
nineteenth. Strohm notes Tinctoris’s assertion (1477) that composers
found fame in their works and also that commentators of the next
generation likened the finest music of the Josquin era to the great works
of pictorial and verbal art. While this latter point incidentally suggests
that music culture does not lag so far ‘behind’ the other arts as we are
often led to believe, it does raise the question of whether even the
contemporary objects in other arts should be considered works in as
strong a sense as they are often regarded. In all, though, it is clear that
the idea of a musical work enjoying a public trajectory and bringing fame
to an absent composer greatly expanded during the sixteenth century.
Historians also observe a growing sense of canon formation and the
predominance of single-author collections; these would suggest the
notion of a ‘great’ composer standing above the merely skilled musician.
This was marked by an adaptation of the traditional veneration of models
from the past (covered by the notion of Imitatio), as encapsulated in
general education by the commonplace book tradition, towards the notion
that creators could be original and actually depart from the past. This
13 Strohm (1993: 1–5, 412–88).
14 Strohm (2000: 139).
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shift was encapsulated by Descartes’ constant call that past authority
should be critically challenged and that all models should be treated with
scepticism. Indeed, one important aspect of the development of stronger
work concepts across all the arts must have lain in the fact that human
originality actually became a possibility. The pre-modern view had
largely been that, given God was the only true creator, any claim to
originality must have counted as heretical.
Yet, time and again, the more one notes an apparent move in the
direction of the work concept (at least in Goehr’s sense), another move
seems to go in the opposite direction – in opera for instance, the genre
that is the first actually to be termed a ‘work’, it was well into the
eighteenth century before the composer became celebrated on an equal
footing even with the singers, and quite often the librettist had pride of
place. Moreover, with the growth of instrumental performance it became
customary to expect some degree of improvisation, and elaboration of
existing notated pieces, thus weakening the absolute authority of nota-
tion. On the other hand, some genres specifically geared towards
performance, such as those performed by the concerto delle donne at
Ferrara in the 1580s, show evidence of the performers obeying the letter
of the notation, diminutions and all,15 although here it is almost as if the
concerto were being celebrated for its unusual practice of not improvis-
ing embellishments – in any case, it may well be that the notation follows
what the singers were accustomed to do rather than vice versa. It was
perhaps a record of past performances, skilfully to be duplicated in the
present and future performances.
In finding resonances between past and present – which is one of the
crucial functions of history, and serves to enhance our own sense of
belonging to a broader culture of humanity, and from which we can learn
certain lessons – the satisfying discernment of similarities between past
and present surely needs to be counterbalanced by an awareness of the
profound differences. For instance, whatever new sense of individuality
did indeed begin to evolve during the course of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, this was against the background of an overriding
belief that music was still grounded in natural and universal rules
governing all musicians, regardless of their local differences. To its
adherents of the time (and perhaps some today), late Renaissance
polyphony embodied assumed natural laws that connected music directly
to the rest of creation; all systems belonged together under a sort of
15 Newcomb (1980: vol. 1, 25–26, 55).
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supernature.16 At best, the aspect of nature increasingly embodied in the
human passions, in the newer musical conceptions straddling 1600,
would have been a lesser one. At worst, the growing emphasis on the
heart rather than mind was to many the beginning of a slippery slope
towards anarchy. This point demonstrates very clearly the way in which
seemingly abstract and internally perfected prima pratica/stile antico
music (i.e. the ‘old’ style of music as seen from the perspective of some
of the newer ones of the seventeenth century) was so fundamentally
different in conception from the more ‘absolute’ branches of music of the
nineteenth century. The abstractness of perfected Renaissance counter-
point was testimony to its contiguity with the whole chain of being,
which after all had never been immediately evident to the naked eye (or,
in this case, ear). The abstractness of later, stronger, work concepts, on
the other hand, was testimony to the separation from the world that could
now be achieved by art, within the world itself.
The theoretical conception of ‘disenchantment’ is particularly relevant
to the discussion of the development of stronger concepts of works. First
formulated by Max Weber, disenchantment highlights the gradual move
away from the magical significance of the world and human practices,
still fully alive in the Middle Ages, along with the veneration of past
ancestors and authorities, and reliance on beliefs in a wider macrocosmic
order – what Adorno and Horkheimer call the ‘extirpation of animism’.17
Although the theory naturally generalises, it remains a useful tool for
viewing the development of the modern world, beginning with the
Renaissance and Reformation, by which assumed connections and reso-
nances between the order of things and souls were gradually dismantled.
But, with the concomitant move towards materialism, the control of
nature and bountiful information, particularly with the scientific revolu-
tion straddling the turn of the seventeenth century, we became alienated
from the objects disenchanted, precisely as these become more familiar
and comprehensible within a rationalised taxonomic system.18 ‘Works’ in
the stronger sense, might then serve to shore up this loss by providing
alternative worlds in which wholeness still pertains – part of what might
sometimes be referred to as a process of ‘re-enchantment’.
Willem Erauw draws attention to a particular point made in Goehr’s
thesis concerning the development of musical works around 1800,
namely that cultural activities assumed the transcendental function that a
16 Chua (2001: 18).
17 Adorno and Horkheimer (1997: 5).
18 Chua (2001).
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declining religious practice could no longer provide.19 He sees essential
practices in reception, such as the motionless concert audience and
reverence for the musical score, as being specifically religious in nature.
From this viewpoint based on reception, it is possible to see why there is
at least a conceptual problem in considering earlier music (at least from
an environment in which it was impossible to question the truths of
religion) as instantiating works in the nineteenth-century sense. This is
not to say that religion completely disappeared in later centuries; indeed,
nineteenth-century religious revivals could themselves be seen as prime
examples of ‘re-enchantment’, a compensation for the loss of the
interconnected and magical world. Rather, religion became one system
among others, to be adopted or contested in various ways.
With disenchantment came the view that the cosmos was not neces-
sarily constructed entirely for mankind’s benefit, so that a new form of
human initiative was required to render the natural world amenable to
human purposes. This is what Hans Blumenberg terms the ‘burden of
self-assertion’. With the new development of scientific method, it became
necessary to adapt man to the impersonal reality uncovered by repeatable
experimentation. But this distinction between reality and the human
condition also brought with it the contrary tendency: to adapt that reality
to the needs and purposes of man.20 The most positive aspect to arise
from this is the potential to see reality as whatever is most actual and
immanent rather than as something that must always remain beyond our
immediate experience. This might be what gives western society its
restless and ongoing energy, a state that I would claim is usefully defined
by ‘modernity’. On the other hand, this development tends to drive a
wedge between the natural world and human civilisation, to suggest that
humankind is progressively alienated from the secure and harmonious
place in the natural order that our cultural memories always seem to
evoke. Hans Robert Jauss usefully relates this line of thinking to a
trajectory leading from Rousseau to Adorno, thus suggesting an intellec-
tual epoch that coincides with the latter part of the era of modernity as I
am trying to outline it.21 However, the sense of a growing rift between
western humanity and nature did not necessarily prevent the re-invention
of the transcendent hidden reality to give human orders support and
justification ‘from beyond’. It is imperative to make a distinction between
‘enchantment’ in its earlier (pre-modern) sense and ‘re-enchantments’ of
19 Goehr (2007: 157); Erauw (1998).
20 Blumenberg (1983: 137–38, 209).
21 Jauss (1987: 243–68).
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various kinds, since the latter are always undertaken in the wake of the
breakdown of the former, and against the background of a disenchanted
modernity.
As must already be clear, I would argue that Jauss’s starting point of
Rousseau is really only a later stage in a process begun with the late
Renaissance and Reformation. The increased emphasis on subjectivity
and individuality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – and by
extension, on some notions of workhood – can themselves be seen as a
compensation for the increasing uncertainty of the natural order. It is
therefore plausible that an increasing sense of individuality in musical
composition does indeed parallel a stronger conception of human indi-
viduality and subjective presence. Yet this – almost paradoxically – does
not necessarily reflect a deeper confidence in the human condition, but
more a reaction to a loss of security within the wider order of things.
Descartes’ famous move was to advocate the total certainty of the
thinking – or rather doubting – mind, compensating for the absolute
uncertainty of everything else. The whole of nature is swapped for the
unshakeable actuality of one’s own existence. Reason, no longer at one
with surrounding nature, becomes a tool to dissect the world. Charles
Taylor links the growing sense of internalisation with the turn against an
external, pre-existent order that is ‘found’ and that determines our station
and role in life, towards a form of order that is made with our own
minds. This is something made overt in Descartes’ work on subjectivity,
particularly in the Discours de la Méthode (1637).22
Hobbes represents the other wing of this turn, by which human order
no longer has an unmediated connection with the raw, natural order of
the world. From the very outset of Leviathan, the ‘art’ of man consists in
constructing artefacts in imitation of nature, which are in essence no
different from the given automaton of the human body, as already created
by God.23 The human creation of the state is but a further fabrication of
this kind. If such a common power is not constructed, man reverts to a
kind of war and famously experiences life as ‘solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short’. It is not so much that there is brutish nature on the one
hand and human civilisation on the other, but that humans need to
construct order out of the various conflicting natural orders at hand
(which, unchecked, represent the condition of ‘mere nature’ in which all
would recklessly pursue absolute liberty). Hobbes’s principal departure
from the old thinking of mankind as part of a broader chain of being is
22 Taylor (1989: 124).
23 Hobbes (1990: 1).
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that the human must take a more active role in ordering nature. The
artificial is as necessary as the natural and is indeed part of a more
refined aspect of nature. Something of this attitude is evident in the way
in which musical instruments rose in importance in the course of the
seventeenth century: the fascination with describing and cataloguing
instruments may well be part of the wider view of using artifice to
improve nature and extend human capabilities.24
Another development was noted by Max Weber, namely his linking of
the move away from ‘natural’ tuning towards tempered systems within
the broader process of ‘rationalisation’.25 Human capabilities are greatly
enhanced by the imposition of an ordered, rational system that patently
ignores the ‘natural purity’ of musical intervals (i.e. that directly derived
from the size of the intervals in the spectrum of harmonics, which
together constitute the timbre of individual pitched notes) in order to
extend the tonal system. Music thus moves out of the natural world into
a seemingly richer world of its own. However much humanist reformers
at the end of the sixteenth century (together with many music critics of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) might have prized music for its
supposedly ‘natural’ qualities, what was becoming increasingly effective
were precisely its independent aspects, its deviation and modification of
supposed natural principles. With this potential for autonomy came the
sense that musical compositions were individuals, following their own
implications and potentials, and thus almost of a piece with the individu-
ality of those who created them.
Hobbes’s sense of authority also suggests that a circulating process is
involved, one by which all authority itself depends on the will of those in
an apparently passive position. In the context of art, this would suggest
that while the concept of individual authorship is elevated, this is at the
same time dependent on the collective will of those who receive the work
composed. We might also recall the example of Lully (who produced
music drama for the court of Louis XIV) here. He was highly complicit
in authorising his monarch’s power, but also in creating his own authority
within the same hierarchy. A stronger seventeenth-century concept of the
musical work thus corresponds to a stronger – but essentially artificial –
concept of human subjectivity, which, in turn, coincides with the rise of
absolutism (a ‘modern’ development despite its seemingly retrograde
political direction). Discrete musical works also began to adopt a series
of internal laws, checks and balances that paralleled Hobbes’s artificially
24 Austern (2001: 44–45).
25 Weber (1958).
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structured state – in other words, something that eschewed the immediate
dictates of nature in order to mediate between the competing forms of
power and authority.
One exceptionally illuminating theory of the role of art in this period is
Lukács’s of the novel: to Lukács, Cervantes’s Don Quixote is the first
true novel, in which the old epic practices no longer connect to the
surrounding totality. The form of the novel thus compensates for the
actual disenchantment of the surrounding world through its very irony.
According to Lukács, Cervantes was writing at a time ‘when man
became lonely and could find meaning and substance only in his own
soul, whose home was nowhere; when the world, released from its
paradoxical anchorage in a beyond that is truly present, was abandoned
to its immanent meaninglessness’.26 The autonomy of the novel, its
formal re-enchantment within its fictional world, its very inessential yet
vital place in its culture, thus show the beginnings of crucial traits in a
new conception of art, that ‘raised the most confused problematic into the
radiant sphere of a transcendence which achieved its full flowering as
form.’27 This sense of distance from the world, this consciousness of the
autonomy of art, clearly resonates with the concept of the musical work
as it reached its full flowering in later centuries. However much this type
of art resembles aspects of the surrounding world, there is no longer a
process of direct imitation, an uncomplicated correspondence between
the world pictured and the world from which we read. To Lukács our
consciousness of the disintegration and inadequacy of the world is the
precondition for the existence of high art and of its becoming conscious
and autonomous.
If Lukács is right, then, there are actual traces of struggle, irony,
distancing, disenchantment and re-enchantment within artefacts that
should be described as ‘works’ in the ‘strong’ sense (and clearly not just
musical ones). The work concept may indeed widely reside in the culture
of reception but it also leaves its tell-tale traces in the artefacts con-
cerned. In this somewhat demanding conception, Goehr may well still be
correct to doubt the existence of musical works long before 1800. It is
clear that earlier music did not generally enjoy that sense of transferabil-
ity and detachment from its contexts that literature was beginning to
experience. One can, of course, point towards developments in composi-
tional practice that do show a sense of abstraction – most significantly an
increasing interest in musical form, even in genres, such as opera, where
26 Lukács (1999: 103–4).
27 Ibid., p. 130.
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the music was assumed to serve other functions. We might even be able
to find examples where musico-dramatic works become self-reflexive,
directly commentating on their contrivance and necessary detachment
from the world. It is perhaps no accident that early operas so frequently
concentrate on music as a dramatic theme, specifically in the form of the
Orpheus myth. Here, music becomes a topic of re-enchantment, a
nostalgia for an ancient age in which music actually had magic power.28
But such is the complexity of issues of authority, commission, intention
and collaboration in early opera, that disenchantment – if there is such –
is the net result of these factors and not easily to be attributed to a single
composer or librettist. It is precisely the ambiguity as to what music
represents or reflects, and by whose authority, that renders the birth of
opera so fascinating. As I have tried to argue, Bach’s two surviving
Passions co-opt the ‘modern’ technologies of opera in order to serve a
traditional religious purpose, thereby creating what is potentially a richer
experience and interpretation of the passion story, but one that is also
detachable from its original religious context.29
There is also the question of pieces that exploit a particular issue of
compositional theory (canon, fugue etc.). It is often these, by composers
such as Palestrina, Frescobaldi and Bach, that became so highly esteemed
in the nineteenth century, since they are already, to some extent, models
of ‘absolute music’. Can these pieces really be ‘works’ if they presuppose
a continuity between the fabric of the music and the hidden structure of
the world? Indeed, this would seem to suggest that they reflect the
survival of a form of musical thought that is yet to be disenchanted, and
thus considerably more distant from the ‘strong’ work concept than might
at first seem apparent. We should be very cautious in assuming that
pieces approaching musical autonomy (i.e. without a text or specific
function) were autonomous in the same way as later works. I am not
trying to argue that no music from the earlier centuries can be treated,
elevated or ‘retrofitted’ as a ‘work’, since the very concepts of work are
not inherent just in a musical manifestation in sound or on paper, but in
the circulation between these and the wider concepts both held in the
period and evolving through reception. It might also be relevant that
some Baroque music designed for religious worship transferred particu-
larly easily into nineteenth-century aesthetics, in which music and the
formal experience of the concert became a sort of substitute religion. But
while it is extremely important to acknowledge that certain aspects of
28 Chua (2001: 25–26).
29 Butt (2010: 197–99).
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thought and culture developed before the nineteenth century would
eventually become crucial in the construction of the stronger work
concepts, we should never presume that the earlier period ever had the
latter in mind.
Finally, the question arises as to whether the historical foundations of
the work concept shed any light on why it suddenly became an issue
towards the end of the twentieth century, and was clearly no longer
something to be considered self-evident. Much of my argument has been
pointing in a particular direction, namely that the development of the
type of strong musical work concept, as defined by Goehr, is part of a
process that is specific to the West, one that I have identified as
‘modernity’. This is not identical with the ‘modernism’ that characterises
much late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century art, but rather some-
thing of a piece with what historians have long described as the ‘modern
age’ (modernism is thus a particular intensification, if not exhaustion, of
the potentialities of modernity). The exact timelines are not perhaps
important, but historians have long used the broad categorisation by
which the Ancient World is separated from the Modern World by the
Middle Ages. Modernity thus has its beginnings in the era of the
Renaissance and Reformation and is fed by the scientific revolution of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Culturally, it surely has some real
presence in Montaigne, Shakespeare and Cervantes, the philosophy of
Locke, Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza. It reaches both a peak and a
crisis at the time of the Enlightenment and French Revolution and
thereafter forges ahead with the industrial revolution and the increasing
dominance of capitalism (and thus the period of Goehr’s work concept).
The development of modernity shows several parallels with the
stronger work concept: the scientific revolution and the notion of
empirical experimentation; the development of a stronger sense of
subjectivity and individuality; separation and specialisation in different
spheres of human endeavour; instrumental reason; and division of labour.
It was precisely this same division of labour that facilitated the develop-
ment of the modern symphony orchestra, where every player has a
specific place and a single instrument to perfect to the highest possible
level, through methodical practice within an approved pedagogical sys-
tem. With the foundation of the Paris Conservatoire in the wake of the
French Revolution, musicians became trained in very specific tasks that
together played a part in a large hierarchical system of orchestras,
soloists, conductors and, of course, composers.
Already there might seem to be something rather oppressive about the
industrialisation of classical music and its increasing range of
re-enchanted texts – those ever more precise scores of musical works.
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But perhaps one of the strengths of the classical tradition and its
associated work concept lay in the way they sat between the establish-
ment – confirming the status quo in sound, as it were – and simul-
taneously opposed or subverted it, challenging its secure assumptions. It
became an art that took inherited orders as its starting point (thus its
reliance on a particularly strong pedagogy of harmony and counterpoint),
but through its seeming autonomy and individuality could act as a
critique of our own assumptions. It could also develop a feeling of
alienation, resistance or even opposition to the surrounding orders. In
other words, it worked dialectically in the sense that it could lead to
results that could never quite accurately be predicted (at least for the
active performer and listener), a real sense of autonomy that distin-
guished this culture and its emerging work concept from one in which
music was always at the service of other arts, religion or politics.
What Goehr’s claims may be reacting against, then, seems to be the
high modernist mindset that tends to assume that autonomous music’s
fictional truth is so refined and honest in its own integrity that it virtually
outdoes any other kind of truth. It is supremely true because it is so
distanced from the messy chaos of the rest of reality. With this in mind,
it is easy to see how the later culture of classical music has contributed so
much to its own self-regarding sense of exceptionality – as something
totally apart from the mundane. The modernist outlook is thus assumed
to apply to the whole of this art of modernity. From this point of view,
the advent of a ‘postmodern’ mindset, or at least that part of it that
undoes the dichotomy of high and low culture, might have provided a
healthy corrective. But, one could ask, might we not also have lost a sort
of productive tension between different types of culture? Should we
perhaps be lamenting the loss of Goehr’s stronger concept of musical
works, which was a sort of religious surrogate upheld by its own
existential dogma?
If there is some symmetry between the pre-modern and the current
situation, one might wonder whether there is a sort of return to the old
scholastic prohibition against curiosity in the unknown or unfamiliar,
against changing the order at hand and violating our inborn place within
that order.30 The place of the religious order that was previously
protected against violation is now reoccupied by that of the global
market, often posing as an ideal democratic principle. If this sort of
attitude is hardly conducive to the cultivation of ‘classical’ music, it is
surely barely any better for the health of any other kind of music, since it
30 Blumenberg (1983), especially pp. 325–29.
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tends to efface the resistant or oppositional elements of any music
whatsoever.
On the other hand, several new possibilities have arisen for reappropri-
ating the ‘museum of musical works’. One particularly rich field is the
emergence of performance studies as an area of serious musical enquiry.
Among several other directions there is the trend towards trying to move
away from works as fixed in scores towards works as events in real time
and in which the performer is fully complicit.31 This involves not just the
issues that are not specified in the score (such as absolute tempo and
rubato) but also creative deviations. Although this might seem to be a
return to the time before the score became dominant, when music could
be spontaneously embellished or even composed, it is clear that improvi-
sation has never really disappeared. Rather, it was usually merely
devalued and ignored by historians of ‘serious’ musical works. As Goehr
herself states in the preface to the second edition of The imaginary
museum (2007), the relation of performance to work is rather like that
between someone practising law and the law as notated: ‘Just as laws are
interpreted or even “performed” in their application to specific cases, so
works are performed in such a way that we would say that without the
performances the authority of works would be of no interest at all.’32
One final issue concerning the ontological status of musical works is
the fact that the perfection of notation might often have been done for its
own sake, and thus not dictating precisely how the music was performed.
At least some of the music of Palestrina – so often seen as the epitome of
notated perfection – was originally performed with levels of improvised
ornamentation that would have wrecked the notated perfection. In other
words, the composer may well have thought of ideal ‘paper music’ and
sounding, ‘performed music’ as two intersecting but not coterminous
forms of music (‘eye’ and ‘ear’ music). Moreover, rather than thinking
that a composer always stood at the beginning of the compositional and
notational process, he might well have been imitating what he heard
performers doing. For instance, it is highly likely that some of the most
spectacular solo numbers by Monteverdi – his ‘Possenti spirto’ from
L’Orfeo and Arianna’s lament (surviving from the lost opera of that
name), were heavily influenced by the styles of the singers for whom the
31 Cook (2013).
32 Goehr (2007: xxxix).
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music was composed; they might even partially be records of what the
singer actually did, thus feeding into the composer’s compositional
process.33
In all then, the weakening of the classical work concept has, at the very
least, allowed us to consider other factors implicit in the music, particu-
larly to do with performance. New media and methods of communication
have also helped to draw attention to different ways of listening to music,
something that could be going well beyond the passivity so often
assumed for the consumption of musical works. Many scholars and
performers relish the ways in which the experience of certain works
might come as close to popular or non-western forms as they do to
traditional concert-hall practice. It is also clear that there is a pronounced
move towards celebrating the human aspects of the classical repertory,
the music being no longer so impersonal and heard only as an object in
its own right.34 There are surely many ways in which pieces of music
might interact with our ever-changing cultural context to bring forth new
meanings, understandings and sensations, but only if we give up the idea
of works as fixed and inviolable objects.
But, some might argue, with the exponential growth in the various
ways in which musical works can be understood, experienced and
enjoyed, might we not have diluted the impact of musical works
compared with the time they were actually ‘works’? Perhaps, like some
of the most unequivocal achievements of western modernity itself
(universal justice, equality of rights, freedom of the individual, etc.),
classical music is not going to endure – as if it were the natural order,
one which would survive even if we did not tend it – without some form
of positive effort.
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